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Third Party Plaintiffs In Civil Rights Damage
Actions
Robert M. Didrick*
N A RECENT LAW REVIEW article' the problem of selective law enforce-
ment by police is discussed, with a view to the use of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 as a defense by one being
prosecuted for the violation of law which others disregard with impunity.
The author's conclusion was that the doctrine of equal protection as a bar
to such convictions will rarely, if ever, be recognized by the courts.
In a case decided in 1965,3 the year of publication of the above arti-
cle, a father and mother attempted a converse approach to the problem.
They found themselves in a situation in which they felt that police offi-
cers were wantonly negligent in the investigation of an accident in which
their son was killed. The action was brought under New York's civil
rights law instead of the federal law, which gives original jurisdiction
over civil rights damage actions to the federal district courts.4 The
complaint alleged that police officers of two neighboring towns in New
York performed their investigation of the motor vehicle accident in such
a manner that the true circumstances surrounding the accident were
either concealed or distorted.
The son, John Napolitano, was walking along a highway at about
8 o'clock on a November evening when he was struck by a car from
behind. Each of the parents, separately and as individuals, alleged two
identical causes of action. The first was that "he (she) has been deprived
of her rights by reason of the misconduct of the agents, servants and
employees of the defendants." The second was that they had been forced
to witness and endure the denial of rights to their deceased son and
consequently suffered extreme mental anguish and disturbance with re-
sulting physical manifestation. The defendants moved for judgment dis-
missing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The court granted the motions to dismiss, citing authority on the
second cause but without a mention of previous cases or other authority
dealing with the first. Motions to dismiss two more causes of action,
alleged by the father as Administrator of the estate of his son, were de-
nied. The question of the liability of a municipality for the negligence
* B.S., Purdue Univ., M.S., John Carroll Univ., patent liaison agent, Lubrizol Corp.,
Wickliffe, Ohio; Fourth year student, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
I Parker, Equal Protection as a Defense to Selective Law Enforcement by Police
Officials, 14 J. Pub. L. 223 (1965).
2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1.
3 Napolitano v. Town of Chili, 47 Misc. 2d 920, 263 N.Y.S. 2d 367 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
Co., 1965).
4 See notes 11-16, infra.
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of its agents was answered in the affirmative, citing several New York
cases. No report of further action on the merits of these causes was
found.
This article will discuss the question of whether third parties may
bring an action for damages against those who deprive another of his
civil rights. The related question, resulting from the second cause of
action in the Napolitano case, of whether one may recover for the mental
anguish caused by the denial of another's civil rights will also be con-
sidered. Although the question is concerned with damage actions, cases
in which injunctive relief was asked are helpful in studying the principle
involved. Relief has been granted in these cases much more readily than
in damage actions, possibly because the equitable relief is easier to
apply.5
The case upon which nearly all of the later cases ultimately rely is
McCabe v. Atchison, T.&S.F.Ry.,6 decided in 1914. McCabe and several
other Negroes attempted to get an injunction against the railroad com-
pany's refusal to furnish Negroes the same accommodations as those
given to whites. No allegation was made that any of the complainants
had ever requested the accommodations. Justice Hughes said
"it is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting
of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it, and the
absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear. The
complaint cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor
does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured
are persons of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly
established, of injury to the complainant-not to others-which
justiftes judicial intervention." I (Emphasis added.)
Later in the opinion, the Justice said, "The desire to obtain a sweep-
ing injunction cannot be accepted as a substitute for compliance with the
general rule that the complainant must present facts sufficient to show
that his individual need requires the remedy which he asks." s
The plaintiff in Brown v. Bd. of Trustees of LaGrange Indep. School
Dist. et al.9 appealed to the circuit court on another point only to have
his standing denied in that court after it was upheld in the trial court.
The rule of McCabe was condensed to ". . . it is elementary that he has
no standing to sue for the deprivation of the civil rights of others."
Williams v. Kansas City, Mo.10 and Armstrong v. Bd. of Educ. of
5 See Syres v. Oil Workers Intl. Union, Local 23, 257 F. 2d 479 (5th Cir., 1958) cert.
denied 358 U.S. 929 (1959). See, as to Third Party impleaders, Oleck, Negligence
Forms of Pleading, 480, 1273, et passim ("Parties" in index) (1957 rev. ed.).
6 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
7 Id. at 162.
8 Id. at 164.
9 187 F. 2d 20 (5th Cir., 1951).
10 104 F. Supp. 848 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1952); aff'd 205 F. 2d 47 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied 346 U.S. 826 (1953).
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Birmingham" were both decided in part upon the rule of McCabe. As
recently as 1962 the Supreme Court has relied on McCabe when it
stated that the appellants lacked standing since they did not allege that
they had been prosecuted under the statute being challenged as un-
constitutional.1
2
The federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions
commenced by any person to recover damages for injury to his person
or property because of the deprivation of any right, privilege or immu-
nity secured by the Constitution of the United States.13 Neither the
amount in controversy 14 nor diversity of citizenship 15 are material to an
action of this type in district court.
Statutes authorizing a civil action for redress of injuries suffered
because of a deprivation of civil rights are found in Title 42 of the United
States Code. Section 1983 of this title provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
A strict constructionist might say that the language of this section
would indicate that the "party injured" does not have to be the same
person whose rights were deprived.
Paragraph 3 of Section 1985 of Title 42 is directed to actions against
two or more persons who conspire to deprive another of his rights.
Section 1988 of this title provides that, where the laws of the United
States are not adapted to the object of the action or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies, the common law, as
modified by the constitution and statutes applicable in the forum where-
in the cause is tried shall govern the courts in the trial and disposition
of the cause.
Mosher v. Beirne'6 is the only other case found aside from Napoli-
tano in which one person was attempting to sue as an individual for
damages because of the denial of another's rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
In this case the plaintiff was denied a license to operate a teen-age club,
and the police closed the club after he operated without a license.
Mosher contended his right to equal protection of the law had been de-
ll 220 F. Supp. 217 (D. C. N. D. Ala., 1963); rev'd 323 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir., 1963).
12 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
14 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331, note 270.
15 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332, note 767.
16 237 F. Supp. 684 (D.C.E.D. Mo., 1964), aff'd 357 F. 2d 638 (D.C.E.D. Penna. 1965).
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nied because of the mayor's arbitrary action under color of law, alleging
that the mayor's purpose was to prevent the employment of colored per-
sons as entertainers in the club. The court said that the plaintiff's alle-
gations were not such as would create a cause of action in him. Relying
upon McCabe, the court said that the plaintiff cannot seek to correct
wrongs allegedly done to others for ". . . it is elementary in civil rights
litigation that one cannot sue over the deprivation of another's civil
rights."
The rule was used in Krum v. Sheppard7 to bring a civil rights
damage action within Michigan's statute of limitations governing actions
to recover damages for injuries to person. The Williams case18 was cited
for authority.
In another case, a father brought suit against police officers who re-
trieved his children while he was attempting to transport them to an-
other state away from his estranged wife. He had no cause of action be-
cause "... . he, himself, had [not] been deprived of any right." 19
Whereas the courts in all of the above cases looked upon the rule of
the McCabe case as an elementary principle, the court in Brewer v. Hoxie
School Dist.20 said, "Although, generally speaking, the right to equal
protection is a personal right of the individual, this is only a rule of
practice which will not be followed where the identity of interests be-
tween the party asserting the right and the party in whose favor the
right directly exists is sufficiently close." The party asserting the right
was, in this case, the school district. It had been granted an injunction
against Brewer and his group which was attempting to force the school
board to drop its desegregation program. In denying Brewer's appeal,
the circuit court said that the board had the duty to afford the children
equal protection, and its right to protection in performing this duty is
identified with the children's rights. The court cited Barrows v. Jack-
son,21 in which the Supreme Court used the phrase "rule of practice"
when it chose not to follow the rule on standing to sue and permitted
the defendant to challenge the enforcement of a racially restrictive cov-
enant, the breach of which was the subject of an action for damages
against him.
An identity of interests-the key which must be possessed in order
to pass through the barrier of the standing to sue rule-might well be
a synthesis of the rulings in Brewer and Barrow and the decision in
17 255 F. Supp. 994 (D.C.W.D. Mich., 1966).
18 Supra, note 10.
19 Denman v. Wertz, 372 F. 2d 135 (3rd Cir., 1967); cert. den. 389 U.S. 941, 83 S. Ct.
300 (1967).
20 238 F. 2d 91 (8th Cir., 1956).
21 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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Truax v. Raich.22 Certainly, the plaintiff in Truax, who was an alien,
had an interest identified with that of his employer who was subject to
the statute being challenged, which restricted the number of aliens an
employer could hire. The question of standing was resolved in favor of
the employee and the statute was declared invalid under the fourteenth
amendment.
Thus, if an "identity of interests" can be shown in a case like that
of Napolitano, the plaintiff may at least have his case heard on its merits.
As will be shown later, a parent, as the administrator of the deceased
child's estate, has been held to have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
1983 through 42 U.S.C. 1988 which has been construed as providing for
the application of a state's survival of actions statute. 23 However, the
amount to be recovered as damages has also been limited by the same
statute.24 To overcome this limitation it will be most valuable to the be-
reaved parents to have a cause of action in themselves for the depriva-
tion of their civil rights.
The case referred to in which an administrator was allowed to in-
voke the Federal Civil Rights Act was thought to be unusual by the
court. Nevertheless, the court did cite Brazier v. Cherry,25 wherein the
court struck down defendant's attempt to show that the precise wording
of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 indicated that Congress purposefully confined
the sanctions of a civil damage suit to the immediate physical victim of
violations. The court could not believe Congress had intended to assure
the living of their constitutional rights but to withdraw such protection
when a deprivation of those rights resulted in death. Pritchard v.
Smith2 6 was cited by the Brazier court as giving an equivalent reach to
42 U.S.C. 1988, when Brazier held that state survival of actions statutes
were among the laws which were to be used to effectuate 42 U.S.C. 1983
and 1985.
Although the plaintiff in Brazier did not invoke 42 U.S.C. 1986, the
court said that the complaint was sufficient to do so. This section of Title
42 gives a right to recover damages against one who has knowledge of
a conspiracy as set out in section 1985 and neglects to prevents its func-
tion when having the power to do so. In Galindo v. Brownell,27 a dis-
trict court in California referred to dicta in Brazier to the effect that an
action would be proper under sections 1983 and 1985, whether the re-
covery sought was for damages to the decedent or for damages sustained
by the survivors. The decedent's mother was said to have standing, as
22 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
23 Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D.C. Colo., 1966).
24 Id. at 224.
25 293 F. 2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
26 289 F. 2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
27 255 F. Supp. 930 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1966).
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an heir of the decedent, to sue for damages for his wrongful death. The
decedent, a minor, had been shot by a Los Angeles County deputy sheriff
and Brownell was a representative of a surety for the county under em-
ployee performance bonds.
No doubt, the courts allowing an action under the federal statutes
upon the theory of a wrongful death action would also limit the recov-
ery to that provided by the forum state's wrongful death statute,2" just
as the District Court of Colorado did in the Brazier case.
How, then, can the parents, widow, children or others having an
"identity of interest" with the decedent overcome those statutory lim-
itations?
Do parents, such as the Napolitanos, have sufficient legal interest
in the investigation of the accidental death of their children, and in the
apprehension and prosecution of those apparently responsible for the
death, so that they may complain in a court of law of unequal protection
of the law if the investigation is done negligently? Or is it a general
interest, in common with the public at large, in the safety from harm as
we go about our business in the normal course of our daily lives? If the
latter, the interest would not be actionable if the interpretation of 42
U.S.C. 1983 by the seventh circuit in Manion v. Holzman29 were fol-
lowed. The facts in this case are far removed from situations considered
here, but section 1983 was invoked. Where the conduct complained of,
the court said, constitutes a public wrong in transgression of a consti-
tutionally protected right but the only impact therefrom is shared by all
members of the public, there can be no personal redress under section
1983.
In Hurlburt v. Graham,3 0 the court found that the investigating offi-
cers in an accident case did not become liable under the Civil Rights Act
by virtue of their investigation and ticketing of the plaintiff. What took
place at the trial was not the officer's responsibility, the court said. But
the court went further in saying that even if the police had given a false
version of the accident, as was charged, the case would not come under
the Civil Rights Act. If the rule were otherwise, the court said, it would
be an invitation to every disgruntled litigant to retry his case in a federal
court by alleging that a false account was given by his opponent.
Still, there is the problem of undue favor and privilege which many
people feel taint accident investigation and enforcement of gambling and
morals charges. The Supreme Court, in a case involving the right to
picket, 31 said the fourteenth amendment's guaranty of equal protection
was aimed at undue favor and individual or class privilege. The deci-
28 Truax v. Raich, supra note 22.
29 379 F. 2d 843 (7th Cir. 1967); cert. den. 389 U.S. 976, 88 S. Ct. 479 (1967).
30 323 F. 2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963).
31 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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sion, which was hostile to the right of mass picketing, runs counter to
later legislation and case law, but the interpretation of the equal pro-
tection clause should still ring true. Public authorities, however, should
not be denied a measure of discretion, and an arbitrary abuse of power
is not to be presumed.32 Essential facts showing discrimination in the
administration of law must be shown. 3 3
Where municipal officers fail systematically to enforce an ordinance
against all affected by it, the equal protection clause is violated. 3 Where
police power is exercised at all, it must be done in an undiscriminating
manner in relation to those falling within the same circumstances. 3
A federal district court in Illinois insisted that it is essential for a
plaintiff to show facts which indicate that the defendant knew or should
have known that his acts would deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights.3
A police officer searched a suspect a second time after his partner had
found nothing suspicious. A package of heroin was found and at the trial
the evidence was admitted. Alleging that the second search was illegal,
the defendant appealed the point and his conviction was vacated. Then
the released suspect charged the searching officer under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
The court said that the Civil Rights Act had created a type of tort, but
that a standard of care must be enunciated by the courts and until a
standard has been set a potential defendant cannot be expected to con-
form his conduct to it. The measure of a citizen's constitutional rights
is not to be left to the determination of the community at large, in this
court's view. How the standard can ever be set if defendants are to be
let off for lack of a standard, the court did not say.
Conclusion
A look into the future of civil rights damage actions was taken in
a recent law review article reflecting upon the history of litigation under
section 1983 before and after the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape.39 The
author had visions of a "Constitutional Tort," and opined that plaintiff's
attorneys will probably explore new areas with recent dicta as a guide.
He cited a need for standards and had some to offer.
I believe that one of these new areas to be developed should be the
rights of third parties to recovery for damages resulting from the denial
32 McCraney v. City of Leeds, 241 Ala. 198, 1 So. 2d 894 (1941).
33 Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
36 Hague v. C.I.O., 101 F. 2d 774 (3rd Cir., 1939); modified on other grounds, 307
U.S. 496 (1939).
37 Lee Optical of Okla. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128 (D.C.W.D. Okla., 1954);
modified 348 U.S. 483.
38 Bowens v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (D.C.N.D. Ill., 1965).
39 Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW.
L. Rev. 277 (Vol. 60). July-Aug. 1965-1966.
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of the civil rights of one in whom they have a bona fide interest. Perhaps
these damages will have to be "parasitic" in nature at first, depending
upon an established cause of action, but the urge of civilization toward
ideality will create a new basis for this recovery as it has for many
established torts.40
40 See generally, Street, Mult. Volume: The Foundations of Legal Liability (1906).
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